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Introduction
The term cybersecurity is subjective and its definition continues to evolve with the
advancement of modern technology. Cybersecurity is often associated with complex technology
and malicious manifestations of security breach. Often overlooked are the human and process
aspects of security assurance and the possibility of accidental security breach or security
oversight. Craigen, Diakun-Thibault, and Purse (2014) provided a comprehensive and adaptable
definition of cybersecurity, which accounts for the various interrelated aspects of the process,
stating “cybersecurity is the organization and collection of resources, processes, and structures
used to protect cyberspace and cyberspace-enabled systems from occurrences that misalign de
jure from de facto property rights” (p. 17). This definition describes a threat-management
process in which infrastructure, including people and policy, are used to defend against
unauthorized access or change to cyberspace or the information stored therein.
The concept of cyber-crime, which includes cyber-attacks and cyber terrorism, is
terrifying for several reasons. Technology is everywhere, from personal homes and vehicles to
the workplace and public space, and is interacted with constantly. Cyber criminals have copious
opportunities to commit crimes, with the advantages of doing so anonymously and at a low cost
(Abeyratne, 2011). McAfee identified ransomware as the fastest growing cybercrime; it costs
approximately $200 to install, but has a staggering impact to both individuals and corporations
(2018, p. 11). The Federal Bureau of Investigation reported $24 million in ransom payments in
2015, which increased to $209 million in just the first quarter of 2016. Altogether, the global cost
of cyber-crime was forecasted to reach $600 billion in 2018, almost double the amount estimated
in 2014 (McAfee, 2018, p. 6). As aviation is an industry that is becoming increasingly
technology-dependent, safety and security professionals must take special care to identify cyber
risks and put appropriate mitigations in place.
Cybersecurity in Aviation
The importance of cybersecurity is recognized by the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), which explains that aviation is complex and integrated by nature and
therefore relies highly on electronic communications and information storage and sharing,
making it a tempting target for the growing threats of data theft. ICAO (2016) called for
international collaboration and coordination in the form of media and initiatives to communicate
cybersecurity issues and unified strategies for addressing them. Specific objectives included
• identification and classification of threats and risks and the systems they may
affect;
• establishment and communication of regulatory and industry stakeholder
responsibility;
• communication of known threats and risks and writing of policy to address them;
and
• development of a global cybersecurity culture (ICAO, 2016).
Cybersecurity issues, according to ICAO (2016), can be addressed via the safety
management system (SMS). In the United States, the Department of Homeland Security
considers the following to be six important areas of aviation to watch for risk: global positioning
systems, operations and information technology infrastructure, air traffic control, wireless
networks, maintenance, and other unknown threats (Higgins, 2017).
Aviation Maintenance
Within aviation, the maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) industry seems
particularly weak in its preparedness to handle cybersecurity issues. The network of original
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equipment manufacturers (OEMs), airlines, and airports is large, and the supply chain consists of
many opportunities for a cyber-criminal to slip in undetected, especially when the target is a
smaller and less cybersecurity-savvy organization. MROs are particularly vulnerable to supply
chain attacks due to their around-the-clock operations, global reach, and the lack of international
standardization in cybersecurity assurance (Costanza & Prentice, 2018). The MRO industry also
has to account for a large number of personnel performing a large number of tasks and airplanes,
maintenance data, and tools that are quickly becoming more digital. The greatest threat faced by
the MRO industry, however, appears to be its own unpreparedness. Oliver Wyman’s 2018 MRO
Survey found that only 50% of OEMs, 41% of airlines, and 9% of MROs have supply chain
security standards and fewer than half of all respondents performed a cybersecurity threat
assessment in 2017 (Costanza & Prentice, 2018, p. 9).
Known issues. There are two high-level categories of vulnerabilities in aviation
maintenance: software and digital data. Software installation and upgrade can occur at many
times during an airplane’s lifecycle by OEMs, airlines, and MROs. Software tampering at any of
these points, for example, may result in interruptions to health and usage data monitoring, which
are used to diagnose in-flight issues and prepare for maintenance (Anton, 2017). Software is also
used in other aspects of aviation maintenance, such as inventory management, supply chain
communication, digital data access, and system diagnostics. Digital data includes aircraft
communication, addressing, and reporting system (ACARS) data and maintenance data (Anton,
2017), but it is a broad category that also includes ships’ records, electronic signatures,
proprietary information, audit results, and records containing personally identifiable information.
The illicit obtainment of an electronic signature, for example, could be used to forge counterfeit
maintenance records.
Purpose
This article is presented to encourage the discussion of cybersecurity in aviation
maintenance and the role of SMS in its assurance. At this time, it is appropriate to ask whether
current SMS practices and tools can be applied to the mitigation of aviation maintenance cyber
threat and cyber risk. It is suspected that some gaps in the SMS framework exist and will need to
be addressed if SMS shall be the methodology by which cybersecurity issues are addressed.
Method
S-W-O-T
A SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis is a useful tool that
helps to identify and categorize aspects of the internal and external environment. In this study,
the environment shall consist of the MRO industry, and the SWOT analysis template shown in
Figure 1 will be populated with its internal strengths and weaknesses and external opportunities
and threats.
STRENGTHS
WEAKNESSES

OPPORTUNITIES

THREATS

Figure 1. SWOT analysis template.
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SMS
The FAA (2017) recognizes four components of an SMS: safety policy, safety risk
management, safety assurance, and safety promotion. An effective SMS consists of all four
components, but the level to which each is necessary may depend on the internal and external
contexts in which the SMS is operating. A SMS, therefore, is constantly adapting to cultural
change within the organization, the organization’s business need, public policy, technology
advances, and current events.
A review of the four components of SMS indicates that all of them are necessary, because
they rely upon each other. Safety policy refers to documented standards, including policies and
procedures, training, and controls. These artifacts describe responsibility, accountability, and
authority of management’s expectations for the organization, and how these expectations will be
met; the value of safety in the organization’s culture is evident through the safety policy (Stolzer,
2017). When processes and expectations are clearly defined, both through safety policy and the
quality management system, the safety risk management process becomes a lot easier to execute.
Safety risk management includes hazard identification, risk analysis, and risk control. Stolzer
stated that an effective risk management system collaborates both internally (such as within the
organization) and externally (such as within the industry) and treats risk management as an
ongoing, iterative process. Safety risk management and safety assurance are closely linked; the
process of safety risk management allows for safety assurance to be successful because it
requires processes and expectations to be defined and risk to be managed to an acceptable level.
Safety assurance then goes one step further and measures the success of safety risk management
through management review of quantitative observation of output. Safety assurance also includes
collecting information from members of the organization via internal and external audits and
voluntary reporting. The SMS most successfully collects data in a safety culture. Stolzer
described safety promotion as a top-down process beginning with executive leadership and
trickling down to individual employees through safety policy. However, safety promotion does
not only begin and end within the organization; regulation and collaborative task forces also have
power to educate about and encourage best practice of safety management.
Results and Analysis
A review of available literature indicates that very little is known about cybersecurity and
its weaknesses in the MRO industry, specifically. Figure 2 organizes the findings into internal
strengths and weaknesses and external opportunities and threats categories.
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STRENGTHS
Developed cybersecurity assessment and
implementation tools, such as International
Air Transport Association (IATA) Aviation
Cyber Security Toolkit, for other aspects of
aviation

WEAKNESSES
Global exchange of MRO services and lack of
global cybersecurity standards
Large supply chain
Lack of extensive background checks for
maintenance personnel (Corretjer, 2018)
Lack of clearly identified aviation
maintenance cyber risks and hazards
Low rate of cybersecurity awareness and
preparedness among MROs

OPPORTUNITIES
ICAO involvement

High reliance on digital communications
THREATS
Increasingly digital inputs (airplanes, data,
tools, etc.)

Adaptable FAA SMS framework
Software or digital data tampering may not be
evident
Figure 2. SWOT analysis for the MRO industry.
Both internal and external to the MRO industry, there are support organizations with
established cybersecurity and SMS processes that can be adapted for use. Some of the internal
weaknesses and external threats may be resolved by an MRO-specific standard cyber risk
management process, such as the lack of global cybersecurity standards, maintenance personnel
background checks, and cybersecurity awareness and preparedness among MROs. Other items in
these two categories can be addressed via the safety risk management function of an SMS or
cannot be helped at all.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The body of knowledge does not currently contain enough information about cyber risk
and hazards in the MRO industry to make reasonable judgments about the SMS framework. This
should not, however, deter organizations from considering cyber risks and hazards in their
current SMSs. Safety risk management should include cyber risks, such as potential data
manipulation and theft and counterfeit data and parts. Risk should be assessed and
communicated both within the immediate organization and throughout the supply chain as part
of the safety assurance function. Through these two activities, the MRO industry can
communicate with its counterparts in the broader aviation community and bodies such as ICAO
and the FAA can help establish the safety policy that is seriously lacking today. Safety policy
can then address remaining weaknesses by ensuring personnel are trained and trusted and
stakeholders throughout the supply chain and around the world are striving to meet the same
cybersecurity standards. ICAO and the FAA can also foster safety promotion by challenging
individual organizations to continuously evaluate their cybersecurity measures as they would any
other SMS policies and procedures.
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